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By RicHARD A. WHITING*
I
Ten years ago in this same city the Scction of Antitrust Law
held its maidcn meeting. The session that first morning was
devoted to a discussion of "The Sherman Act and Big Business,"
and John Cahill, a distinguished menber of the New York Bar and
one of those instrumental in organizing the new Section, delivered
a paper which he titled, Must We Brand American Business by
Indictment as Crimnal?1 His answer was an cmphatic "no."
Mr. Cahill's conclusion was that the criminal provisions of the
Sherman Act should be repealed," although he was quick to add,
"No doubt the [Justice] Department will not be satisfied by such a
suggestion."' And as if to dcnmonstrate its dissatisfaction, the
Department brought a higher proportion of criminal antitrust suits
in the year following his address than in any post Thurman Arnold
year.4
Roughly two out of every five Government suits over the past
ten years have been criminal suits. A few weeks ago, the present
head of the Antitrust Division in a speech before the American
Society of Corporate Secretanes, noted that "the proportion of
* Member, District of Columbia Bar. A.B., 1943, Dartmouth College; LL.B.,
1949, Yale University.
1 Cahill, Must We Brand American Business By Indictment As Criminal?
A.B.A. Proceedings of Section on Antitrust Law 26 (1952). See also, in a similar
vein, Hazard, Are Big Businessmen Crooks? Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1961, p. 57.
Cf. Kramer, Criminal Prosecutions for Violations of the Sherman Act: In Search of
a Policy, 48 Geo. L.J. 530 (1960).
2 Cahill, supra note 1, at 46:
The only real and latsing solution is to cut down the tree and notjust the fruit. The criminal penalties attaclung to antitrust violations
must ne completely eliminated, with crimnal prosecution permissible
only for violation of a civil decree, or for racketeering activities.
3 Cahill, supra note 1, at 46.
4 In calendar year 1953, the Justice Department brought a total of 29 anti-
trust suits; of these, 19 (66%) were criinnal. See Appendix, Table A, Civil and
Criminal Antitrust Suits Brought by Justice Department, 1890-1960, Whiting,
Antitrust and the Corporate Executive, 47 Va. L. Rev. 929, 984-85 (1961).
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criminal cases filed in 1961 was the lowest of any year in the last
decade."" But this scarcely can be taken as signaling a change in
enforcement policy if the 1962 returns are read and tallied, for
nearly half of the cases filed in the first six months of this year were
criminal cases-a ratio which, if maintained for the balance of
1962, will surpass that of all but three of the past ten years and
exceed the ten-year average by a comfortable margin.6
In short, the criminal suit is still very much with us, and the
indications are that it is enjoying renewed popularity
Of particular significance to my topic is the fact that since the
Section first met here ten years ago, over 400 American business-
men have, along with their corporations, been branded by indict-
ment as Sherman Act criminals. Again, it is the recent statistics
that are the most interesting-and for the businessman, the most
ominous:
(1) Of this ten-year, 400-plus total, 128 businessmen-corpo-
rate officers and representatives-were named as defendants
in indictments filed dunng the past eighteen months;
(2) Over 70% of the criminal suits brought in 1961-1962
have named one or more corporate representatives as co-
defendants-a proportion considerably higher than in any
year since 1952; and
(3) During the first six months of this year alone, more
corporate representatives were indicted for alleged antitrust
violations than had been indicated in any year since 1950.
It seems clear beyond doubt that the Justice Department is
determined wherever possible to personalize corporate antitrust
guilt. What's more, the Civil Investigative Demand legislation
5 Address by Lee Loevinger, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, before the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Atlantic
City, N.J., June 19, 1962. The statement is repeated in Loevinger, Antitrust ts
Pro-Busness, Fortune, Aug. 1962, p. 96, 126. During calendar year 1961, the
Department brought 41 civil actions and 20 criminal suits. Included in the latter,
is one criminal information charging two corporate officers with violating §14 of
the Clayton Act, 88 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §24 (1958), after the Sherman
Act indictments as to them (also filed in 1961) had been dismissed. The 41 civil
suits included 18 antimerger complaints under §7 of the Clayton Act, 88 Stat. 731
(1914), 15 U.S.C. §18 (1958), (more than in any preceding year), 9 damage
suits arising out of the electrical industry indictments, and 5 suits seeking to enjoin
practices which were made the subject of contemporaneous criminal actions.
6 23 (47%) of the 49 suits brought during the first half of calendar year
1962 have been criminal suits. The 26 civil complaints include 8 actions under §7
of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §18 (1958), and 11 suits to
enjoin practices as to which contemporaneous indictments were filed.
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when passed7 may serve (by obviating to some extent the need for
grand jury testimony with its attendant witness immunity) to
broaden the base from which the Department selects its manage-
ment targets.
II
Obviously not every corporate officer is ex offico a potential
defendant when his corporation has committed an antitrust viola-
tion. What degree of complicity in the corporate offense is apt to
brand him personally? The Supreme Court's decision this past
June in United States v Wise," by laying down at least the broad
guidelines, has gone a long way towards answenng the question.
Raymond Wise, a vice president and director of National Dairy
Products Corporation, was indicted with his company in the fall
of 1959. National was charged in fifteen counts with violations of
section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Robinson-
Patman. Wise was indicted in two counts for violations of both
statutes, the indictment incorporating by reference the alleged
illegal acts of the corporation. In a bill of particulars the Govern-
ment charged that Wise participated in those acts "solely in his
capacity as an officer, director, or agent who authorized, ordered,
or did some of the acts constituting in whole or in part the viola-
tions alleged to have been committed" by the corporation. This, of
course, is almost exactly the language of section 14 of the Clayton
Act, and Wise moved for a dismissal of the indictment as to him
on the ground that he could not be indicted under the Sherman
ActY Rather, he claimed, the only statute applicable to corporate
officers acting solely in a representative capacity was section 14 of
the Clayton Act. The distinction was more than technical, for
conviction under section 14 carnes a maximum penalty of $5,000
7See Decker, The Civil Investigate Demand, 51 Ky. L.J. 449 (1963).
Although demand can only be made pursuant to investigation of a "civil antitrust
volation" (the express insertion of "civil" by the House being agreed to by the
Senate in conference), provision is made in the measure for use of the demanded
documents by a Justice Department attorney in a grand jury or criminal pro-
ceeding.
8370 U.S. 405 (1962).
9 The Robinson-Patman charge had previously been dismissed by the District
Court as to both the corporate defendant and Wise on the ground that §3, 49
Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(a) (1958), is unconstitutionally vague. United
States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 1961 Trade Cas. 170,047 (W.D. Mo. 1961),
prob. 7uns. noted Oct. 9, 1961, 368 U. S. 808 (1961), argued March 21, 1962,
asngned for reargument in October 1962 term, 369 U.S. 833 (1962). Section 3
of the Robinson-Patman Act has a maximum fine of $5,000.
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on each count, whereas a person found to have violated the Sher-
man Act, since its amendment in 1955, may be fined up to ten
times that amount.
The District Court in Kansas City, per Judge Smith, agreed
with Wise and granted his motion. ° Similar motions were later
made by corporate reprcsentatives in suits filed in other junsdic-
tions so that, by the time the Supreme Court rendered its decision
on the appeal from Judge Smith's ruling, the score in the distnct
courts stood at six pre-Clayton and two pro-Sherman." As you
know, the Supreme Court, in June, cast the deciding vote. Re-
versing the Distnct Court, it held that Wise had been properly
indicted under the Sherman Act.
The final terse paragraph of the Chief Justice's opinion,
describes the circumstances under which a corporate representative
will be held accountable for his company's violation:
[Wie hold that a corporate officer is subject to prosecution
under §1 of the Sherman Act whenever he knowingly par-
ticipates in effecting the illegal contract, combination, or
conspiracy-be he the one who authonzes, orders, or helps
perpetrate the crime-regardless of whether he is acting in a
representative capacity.Y2
Basically, the Court concluded that Congress when it wrote in
1890 that "every person" who violated the Sherman Act would be
subject to its sanctions had no intention of excluding persons
acting for or on behalf of a corporation. This was a point, by the
way, all but ignored in the government's briefing and argument,13
the thrust of its attack centering upon what Congress intended
nearly twenty-five years later when it enacted section 14 which,
unlike section 1 of the Sherman Act, expressly deals with corporate
"directors, officers or agents."
30 United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 196 F Supp. 155 (W.D. Mo.
1961).
"1 United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 415 n.1 (1962) (concurring opinion).12 Id. at 416.
1 The legislative history of the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act is set
forth in a single but lengthy footnote in the government's brief. See Brief for the
United States, pp. 15-17, n.8, United States v. Wise, 870 U.S. 405 (1962). In
reporting the Supreme Court argument, the Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Report states: "It was when he reached the effect of the 1914 enactment of the
Clayton Act that [counsel for the Government] turned to legislative history.
In [is] view the issue in the case is whether Congress intended, when it enacted
Section 14 of the Clayton Act, to make it harder or easier to convict corporate
officers for antitrust violations." BNA Antitrust Rep. No. 40, pp. A-7, 8 (1962).
1963]
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It would serve no useful purpose to debate the wisdom of the
Wise decision. My own views may be inferred from an article I
wrote late last year in which I concluded that the case had been
"correctly decided" by the district court.' 4 Undaunted, let me
venture a few comments which I think flow logically in Wise's
wake.
First, for all practical purposes section 14 of the Clayton Act
has been rendered a dead letter and those of you pressed for shelf
space can remove it from your compilations. According to the
Court, it was enacted simply as a "reaffirmation of the Sherman
Act's basic penal provisions and a mandate to prosecutors to bnng
all responsible persons to justice."' 15 Its operative language, "who
shall have authorized, ordered, or done," has now been read
directly into the Sherman Act.'"
Second, while the standards enunciated by the Court for hold-
ing the corporate representative refer only to criminal prosecutions
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the reasoning of the decision
makes these standards equally applicable to civil suits to enjoin
violations of section 1 and to both civil suits and criminal prosecu-
tions brought under sections 2 and 3 of the Sherman Act.17
14 Whiting, supra note 4, at 945.
15 United States v. Wise, 870 U.S. 405, 414 (1962).
16 Although the precise language used by Chief Justice Warren is "authonzes,
orders or helps perpetrate the cnme" (see note 12 supra and accompanying text),
this language is substantially identical to the §14 terrmnology "authonzed, ordered
or done any of the acts constituting in whole or in part such violation." Webster s
Dictionary (2d ed. 1944) definition of "perpetrate" is "to do or to perform, to
commit (as an offense)." (Emphasis addea .) And the verb "help" according to
Webster s, means, "to aid; assist to aid in bringing about, causing to lend
aid; to avail or be of use to," which clearly cames over the "in whole or in part"
connotation.
17 The Court's finding that Congress intended to include representative actors
in making liable "every person" who commits the previously-defined §1 offense
would clearly extend to the almost identical constructions of Sherman Act §§2 and
8. "Every person" is also made guilty of a misdemeanor (and subject to a maxi-
mum fine of $5,000) for a combination or conspiracy in violation of §73 of the
Wilson Tariff Act, 37 Stat. 667 (1913), 15 U.S.C. §8 (1958). Compare §3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act (maximum fine also $5,000). which makes it unlawful for
any person to "assist in" any of the three offenses defined in that statute, but
which as to two of these offenses requires proof that the acts were engaged in
"for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.' Corpo-
rate representatives may also be but seldom are made defendants m civil suits
brought by the United States seeking injunctive relief or by one claiming to have
been injured by the violation and seeking treble damages and/or an injunction.
Dunng calendar year 1961, no corporate official was made a party to a govern-
ment civil antitrust complaint. See generally Whiting, supra note 4, at 950-65
(government civil suits) and 972-81 (private actions). Corporate officers are
frequently named as respondents along with their corporations in FTC com-
plaints and included specifically in FTC orders to cease and desist. See Whiting,
(Continued on next page)
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Third, any question as to vulnerability of the executive who
occupies a position of responsibility from which he could have
controlled the illegal activities of subordinates, had he known of
them, appears to have been resolved by the decision. While early
in its opinion the Court reads the Sherman Act as applying to "all
officers who have a responsible share in the proscribed transac-
tion,"1'8-and conceivably this concept could be stretched to in-
culpate the "see, hear, speak-no-evil" supenor-the holding is that
only he who "knowingly" participates will be made to suffer.
Knowledge presumably may be proved circumstantially (though in
a criminal case, beyond a reasonable doubt), but there is no warrant
under Wise or otherwise for imputing liability to the unknowing
executive.
Fourth, even if the representative knows of some or all of the
unlawful activity, he cannot be held liable unless he "participates."
Participation, we are told, may involve the actual doing of one or
more of the challenged acts or ordenng that they be done by
others. It may also include authorizing their commission. Can
authorization (i.e., participation) be implied from the supenor's
knowledge, coupled with his passive acquiescence or continued
non-action? Perhaps, though a careful reading of the opinion sug-
gests that the Court had something of a more affirmative nature
in mind, it cites with apparent approval, for example, two early
iFootnote continued from preceding page)
supra note 4, at 965-72. The potential consequences of violation of an FTC
order are discussed n Austern, Five Thousand Dollars a Day, 51 Ky. L.J. 481
18 United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 409 (1962). The executives responsi-
bility to his corporation may be greater. In Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
182 A.2d 328 (Del. Ch. 1962), stockholders of Allis-Chalmers charged the com-
pany s directors with breach of their fiduciary duty inermitting the company
to become engaged m practices that were the subject of te Philadelpia electrical
indictments (and as to which thq company bad pled guilty). Plaintiffs sought to
make the directors liable for the fines imposed upon the company in the govern-
ment suits, any sums the company might have to pay to damage claimants, and
for damages due to alleged injury to the firms business reputation and good will.
There was no evidence that the directors knew of the employees misconduct.
The opimon of Vice Chancellor Marvel is prncipally concerned with whether
they "knew or should have known of facts which constructively put them on
notice" of the illegal activities. In tis view, "it is only where the facts and
circumstances of an employee s wrongdoing clearly throw the onus for the ensuing
results on inattentive or supine directors that the law shoulders them with the
responsibility here sought to be imposed" and among the circumstances to be
considered are "the nature of the business, its size, the extent, method and
reasonableness of delegation of executive authority, and the existence or non-
existence of zeal and honesty of purpose in the directors performance of their
duties." Applying those tests to Allis-Chalmers and its directors, the Court
ordered the complaint dismissed.
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Sherman Act decisions holding that a corporate officer is properly
indicted when charged with "personal participation, direction or
activity"' 9 as an "actor," an "actual, present, and efficient actor,"
or as one of those "active in promoting [the] misdemeanor."20
Both the majority and the concumng opinions repeatedly resort to
the words "acts," "acted" and "acting" to describe representative
conduct that may be subject to the Sherman Act's bans.
Fifth and finally, Wise may well be a blessing in disguise. As
noted, the opinion does much to clarify legal standards for holding
the executive liable. While it also makes clear his exposure to a
possible $50,000 fine, it may at the same time have blunted efforts
in Congress, spurred by the revelations of the electncal cases, to
enlarge the area of representative responsibility2' and increase
penalties for representative violations beyond those now set forth
in the Sherman Act.22
19 United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 Fed. 823, 882 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1906), quoted in United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 410, n.3 (1962).2 0 United States v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578, 581 (D. Mass. 1912), quoted in
United States v. Wise, supra note 19, at 410. But see, Milton Handler, referring
to § 14 in testimony earlier this year before the Senate Antiionopoly Subcom-
mittee: "I think that there may be cases where reaction could very well be
participation. I think that if a group of corporation officers are about to
engage in flagrant price fixing and they go up to the president and tell hun that,
his silence can very well be acquiescence and he very well may be participating."
Hearings on S. 996, S. 2252, S. 2254, S. 2254 and S. 2255 before The Subcom-
mittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
(Increasing Criminal Penalties), 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1962).
21 Companion bills introduced by Senator Kefauver and Representative Celler
in the current Congress, S. 2254 and H.R. 8138, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961),
would amend Clayton Act §14 inter alia to impose liability upon corporate repre-
sentatives for the ratification of acts constituting a violation. Ratification could
be defined as the possession of knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that a
corporation is engaged m or about to engage in an violation, the possession of
express or implied authority to stop or prevent such violation or to report it to
someone with authority to stop or prevent it, and the failure to exercise that
authority. This, it might be noted, seems broad enough to catch the knowing or
suspicious and non-reporting house counsel. Compare Comment, Increasing Com-
munity Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71
Yale L.J. 280, 808 (1961), recommending that there be imposed "upon every
corporate executive an affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care to discover and
prevent acquisitive corporate crime [defined earlier in the comment to be that
species of crime committed for the purpose of increasing corporate, as distin-
guished from personal, wealth] within the area of business actually under his
effective control," and that failure to fulfill this duty be made a misdemeanor,
puishable by a short prison term."
22See S. 2252, H.R. 8136, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), amending §§1, 2
and 3 of the Sherman Act to increase the maximum fines to $100,000 and to make
jail sentences, as well as fines, mandatory upon a second offense; S. 2258, H.R.
8137 (see supra note 21), 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), making a jail sentence,
as well as a fine not exceeding $100,000 mandatory for per se offenses; S. 2254,
H.R. 8138, increasing the maximum fine for Clayton Act §14 offenses to $100,000
and providing for mandatory imprisonment along with a fine for a second offense.
(Continued on next page)
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III
These two recent developments-the increasing frequency with
which corporate officials are being indicted and the decision m
Wise clari yng both the circumstances under which they may be
indicted and the potential consequences when they are-make it
appropnate, I think, to re-examine the question Mr. Cahill asked
ten years ago.
For a bnef period m the late '30's and early '40's when Judge
Arnold was in charge of the Antitrust Division, something over
two-thirds of the government antitrust suits instituted were brought
on the criminal side. It was his view that criminal prosecution was
the only effective deterrent to antitrust violation and that civil suits
were useful merely as a "supplement to the criminal proceeding."23
Subsequent Attorneys General and their Assistants have announced
a more moderate policy of bringing criminal suits only where
violations were wilful or fell clearly within one of the hard-core, per
se type categones.2s The record of the past ten years indicates
that with few exceptions, 25 the policy has been adhered to. I am
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Bills introduced in both the Senate and House, S. 996 and H.B. 4176, although
not identical, would give a court power under certain circumstances to bar an
individual convicted of an antitrust violation from continuing as an officer of his
or another convicted corporation and would impose other penalties, including
express demal of indemnity for fines or legal expenses. Hearings were held on
the Senate measures on September 6 and October 2. 1961, and on March 9, 1962.
See supra note 20.
23 Arnold, Antitrust Law Enforcement, Past and Future, 7 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 5, 16 (1940).2 4 See, e.g., Testimony of Attorney General Clark, Heanngs Before the Sub-
committee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, pt. 1, at 73, 88-89 (1949); Testimony of
Assistant Attorney General Bergson, ul. at 380; Brownell (then Attorney General),
Economic Liberty Under the Antitrust Laws, 1954 CCH Antitrust Law Sym-
posum 22; Statement of Assistant Attorney General Barnes, 1955 Atty. Gen. Nat'l
Comm. Antitrust Rep. 350.2 5 Only four Sherman Act criminal cases could be found in the CCH Sum-
mary of Cases instituted by the United States from 1952 to 1962-which did not
clearly allege per se offenses. All of these charged monopolization or attempted
monopolization. See United States v. Kansas City Star Co., Cr. No. 18444, D.
Kans., 1953 (Dep't of Justice Case No. 1151), defendants found guilty, 1955
Trade Cas. 68,041 (D. Kans. 1955), aff'd 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied 354 U.S. 923 (1956); United States v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., Cr. No.
15463, W.D. Pa., 1958 (Dep't of Justice Case No. 1374) (pleas of nolo con-
tendere accepted by court); United States v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers, Inc., Cr.
No. 15393, N.D. Tex., 1958 (Dep't of Justice Case No. 1413), found not guilty
by District Court, 1959 Trade Cas. 169,259 (N.D. Tex. 1959); United States v.
General Motors Corp., No. 61-CR-356, S.D.N.Y., 1961 (Dep't of Justice Case No.
1605), transferred to District Court in Illinois, 1961 Trade Cas. 70,076 (N.D.
Ill. 1961). No individuals were indicted m the General Motors case, which was
brought only under §2.
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not aware of any similar pronouncement by the present head of the
Antitrust Division. It does seem significant, however, that since
he took office in March of last year, 39 of the 40 cnmmal suits
instituted have involved some form of price-fixing, 26 and every one
of the 31 cnminal suits naming corporate officials as co-defendants
has charged this type of offense.
The uncertainty of application of the antitrust laws to many
non-per se areas of business conduct certainly needs no elaboration
before this audience. One can sympathize with the businessman
who makes a conscientious effort to comply with the confusing,
changing and often conflicting antitrust mandates. Most, I think,
will agree that cnmmal pursuit of the businessman for such in-
definite transgressions is, as Cahill put it, "in contradiction of
American ]ustice and democratic principle. '28 At the same time,
most businessmen today, when they actually agree with their
competitors on pnces, on ngging or rotating bids, on allocating
customers or territories, or on boycotting another's business, know
they are running a grave antitrust nsk. For those who play such
games and lose, the cnminal suit seems altogether appropnate.
Between these extremes, however, there will be conduct which
if cast in the formal language of a Sherman Act indictment would
read like a per se offense but which will lack any element of
deliberate violation and be wholly free of any immoral taint. One
26 Statistics compiled from the current supplements to CCH, The Federal
Antitrust Laws with Summary of Cases Instituted by the U.S. (through June 30,
1962). The one suit not concerning price fixing is United States v. General Motors
Corp., supra note 25 (monopolization of manufacture and sale of railroad loco-
motives). Both United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., Cr. No. 61-73-D,
D. Minn., 1961 (Dep't of Justice Case No. 1638), and United States v. Learner
Co., Cr. No. 11736, D. Haw., 1962. (Dep't of Justice Case No. 1674), contain
charges of price-fixang but appear to be basically conspiracy and attempt to
monopolize cases. In United States v. Consolidated Papers, Inc., Cr. No. 14087
D. Wis., 1962, (Dep't of Justice Case No. 1682) (criminal information), and
United States v. Flynn-Learner, Cr. No. 11735, D. Haw., 1962 (Dep't of Justice
Case No. 1673), it is alleged that the defendants conspired to fix (hold down)
the prices of their suppliers. Cf. United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., Cr. No. 39017,
E.D. Mich., 1961 (Dep't of Justice Case No. 1631), where a patentee is charged
with conspinng to fix th eresale prices of its licensee. Not all price-fixing is
pursued by indictment. Civil complaints, rather than indictments, were chosen to
attack both horizontal and resale price fixing in several suits brought during the
past eighteen months. See e.g., Dep't of Justice Cases Nos. 1594, 1595, 1639,
1672, 1675, 1677, 1685, 1686, 1688.
27Cf. United States v. Learner Co.. supra note 26 (two officers named).
Although price fixing, as such, is not alleged in the indictment m United States v.
General Motors Corp., Cr. No. 30132, S.D. Cal., 1961, (Dep't of Justice Case No.
1628) (four officers named), the conspiracy is alleged to have been for the pur-
pose of eliminating discount sales.
28 Cahill, supra note 1, at 31.
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may rightfully question, for example, whether the cnminal suit is a
proper vehicle for testing identical industry pncing, absent strong
pre-indictment evidence of actual collusion,2 a supplier's refusal to
deal with a persistent discounter, 0 or an agreement to fix pnces
where a senous question exists as to the industry's antitrust im-
munitys ' or its involvement in interstate commerce. 2 In short,
while the wilful, per se criteria are good starting points, they should
be applied with their own rule of reason. Perhaps no fairer or more
flexible policy can be devised than that urged by the Attorney
General's Committee-.e., that criminal cases "should be confined
to instances where proof of violation is clear and the law is set-
tled."s
Iv
Even so, one cannot read the steady stream of indictments as
they are filed, most of them charging some lear instance of pnce-
fixing or bid-rigging, and not wonder how the individuals involved
brought about their predicaments. From my own limited observa-
tions, I have found that more often than not they -fall into one of
three categones. There are those who feel their company or indus-
try is too small to concern the enforcement agencies. These are
the presidents, vice-presidents and sales managers who cling to the
notion that the Sherman Act is directed against big business-the
du Ponts, General Motors and General Electrics-and are gen-
uinely surprised when the FBI pays them a visit. The second group
knows it should not fix prices, so evolves all sorts of subtle and
devious means to accomplish that very result short of actual written
or around-the-table agreement. Some of those included in this
20 See United States v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. f169,619
(N.D. Okla. 1960); United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1959 Trade Cas. 1169,536D.N.J. 1959).30See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 1957 Trade Cas. 1168,586 (D.D.C.
1957) (motion for acquittal granted). A companion civil suit alleging the same
violations was also disrmssed by the District Court, 164 F Supp. 827 (D.D.C.
1958), revd, 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
31 See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass n, 322 U.S. 533(1944); United States v. American Medical Assn. 317 U.S. 326 (1943); United
States v. North American Van Lines, 1957 Trade Cas. 1168,761 (D.N.M. 1957).Cf. United States v. North American Van Lines, Cr. No. 527-61 (D.D.C., 1961)(D 't of Justice Case No. 1615), transferred to District Court in Indiana, 1962
Trade Cas. 1170,283 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
32See United States v. National Ass n of Real Estate Bds.. 80 F Supp. 350(D.D.C. 1948). Cf. United States v. South Florida Asphalt Co., 1962 Trade Cas.f170,257 (S.D. Fla., 1962) (dismnssmg indictments). A subsequently filed criminal
information was also dismissed. See BNA Antitrust Rep. No. 36, p. A-15.83 1955 Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 851.
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category sincerely believe they have skirted the statute, others that
they have covered thcir tracks too cleverly to be caught. The third
group knows it is courting trouble but is willing to take its chances.
Sometimes members of this group arc able to justify their actions,
at least to themselves, by a variety of consciencc-salving explana-
tions: prices, after all, were not unreasonable, agreed-upon increases
were sorely needed and long overdue, or joining the conspiracy
was necessary to stay competitive or even in business.
As antitrust counsel I think we must bear some of the blame
for each of these attitudes. We know better, but the problem, a
very difficult problem, is in communicating cffectivcly our knowl-
edge to our clients.3 4
Those of us who have small business clients should impress
upon them the fact that they are by no means indictment-proof.
Better than four out of every five companies named as defendants
in government antitrust suits during recent years do not even
appear in the Fortune directories of the 500 largest corporations.3 5
Moreover, it is the top management of these smaller companies
-the presidents and vice-prcsidents-that are commonly named
with their compames.3 6
With the big companies this is rarely so. The individual
defendants here are commonly drawn from a second or third
management tier-persons with such titles as district or division
sales manager, plant manager, assistant director of marketing and
the like.3 7 For those of us with big business clients, this suggests
34 Much has been written recently on the subject of preventive antitrust.
See e.g., Creighton, Corporate Counseland Antitrust, 48 A.B.A.J. 654 (1962);
Freedman, Antitrust: The Education of a Client, 17 Bus. Law. 321 (1962);
Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Executive II, 48 Va. L. Rev. 1, 4-18 & n.17(1962) (citing earlier articles). Most of these contain suggestions as to what to
say and how to say it. In many compames counsel's problem may be more basic,
viz, to convince management that what might be said needs saying.
35 See Whiting, supra note 34, at 2-3 & Appendix II.
36 See Kramer, supra note 1, at 540-41; Comment, 71 Yale L.J. 280, 291-92
(1961). Seventy corporate presidents and vice-presidents were indicted during
the years 1957-1960, 52 of which were officers of compames not included in the
top 500. Twelve of the remaiinng 18 top executives of "big" cornpames indicted
were presidents or vice-presidents of eelctrical compames named in the 1960
Philadelphia suits, and four of the 18 were defendants in United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., No. 60 Cr. 422, S.D.N.Y., 1960 (Dep't of Justice Case No.
1576) a criminal contempt action. None of the individual defendants were
defendants in the original antitrust suit.3 7 Presumably because of the greater difficulty in fixing responsibility for the
big company violation, roportionally fewer officers of such compames of any rank
have been indicted. Thus, while during the 1957-1960 period 101 compames
ranked m the top 500 were indicted (including companies named in more than
(Continued on next page)
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either that we are not talking to the right people or that our message
is not getting to those down the line and in the field.
I also suspect that we sometimes unwittingly confuse our
businessmen clients by over-emphasizing those areas of antitrust
that are more controversial and therefore more interesting to us
than the relatively predictable per se offenses. At worst, by stressing
the inconsistencies and absurdities-and there are many-we may
breed cynicism and disrespect. The esotenca of antitrust, I believe,
are more properly subjects for the advanced courses. The basic
course should be Per Se I and it should teach that all arrange-
ments, however arrived at, between competitors affecting prices
(whether high, low, necessary or reasonable) or allocating produc-
tion, customers, or territories are fraught with antitrust conse-
quences and that attempted concealment is not only marked for
failure, but also likely to aggravate the consequences. 38
Of course there is always the Group III client who will listen
attentively and proceed to ignore-for reasons sufficient unto him-
self-the advice we have given. For such a person I suppose there
is not much that can be done once we have pointed out dearly
what the consequences of his disregard may be both to his company
and to him personally A summary of the individual's risks might
well include these six basic points:
(1) The current tendency, as we have seen, is to personalize
liability for antitrust violations. The corporate representative can-
not depend on the corporate structure to shield him from prosecu-
tion. Nor can he expect to be protected by his corporate position,
be it high or low The Justice Department has shown no inclina-
tion to discnminate on the basis of rank, but has sought to indict
every person in a responsible corporate position as to whom there
is evidence of participation in the antitrust violation.
(2) Participation does not mean that a corporate representa-
tive, to be indictable, must be caught with his own fingers in the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
one indictment but not including the corporate defendants in the electrical suite),
only 13 officers of those companies were named as defendants. The electrical suits(44 individuals indicted) may have emboldened the Justice Departinent. At any
rate, during 1961 and the first six months of this year, 87 officers of 39 Fortune-
ranked companies have been named as co-defendants-including 12 presidents
and vice-presidents and one chairman of the board.
38 For example charges in the electrical industry indictments of defendants
efforts to conceal their activities were cited by the government as reason whyjudge Ganey should reject the proffered nolo pleas. See United States v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. f69,699 at 76?754 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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antitrust pie. Superiors who order or authorize subordinates to
engage in the illegal activities are as vulnerable to prosecution as
if they were themselves the effective actors.
(3) Violations may bnng a prsonal fine of up to $50,000 on
each count of the indictment. Severe fines are no longer an idle
threat, as those imposed upon executives in the Safeway and elec-
trical industry cases, among others, have demonstrated.3 9
(4) The expense, inconvenience and lost working hours in-
volved in defending or settling the onginal Justice Department
suit and any private actions arising therefrom must be regarded as
additional penalties. Indeed, they are frequently more costly and
onerous than the fine itself.40  Fines paid and legal expenses
incurred by the executive in many cases may not be reimbursable by
the corporation.4 1 And there is always the possibility that angry
30 In United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Cr. No. 9584, N.D. Tex., 1955
(Dep't of Justice Case No. 1268), a corporate officer pleading nolo contendere
was fined $35,000 on each of two counts and $5,000 on a third (but see infra
note 41). In the electrical cases, fines totalling $137,500 were levied against 36
executive defendants, including individual fines of $12,500 and $7,500. Dep't
of Justice Cases Nos. 1496, 1498, 1500, 1504, 1506 and 1507 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
In United States v. Consolidated Laundnes Corp., Cr. No. C.152-79, S.D.N.Y.,
1957 (Dep't of Justice Case No. 1316), after a court finding of guilty (1958
Trade Cas. 1169,077- 1960 Trade Cas. 169,702), one individual defendant was
fined $15,000 on each of two counts, plus one quarter of the costs of the
government's prosecution, and three other individuals were each fined $10,000 on
each of two counts, plus one quarter of the costs of the government's prosecution.
The individuals were also given six and three month prison terms. The case was
reversed and remanded by the Second Circuit, 291 F.2d 563 (Id. Cir. 1961), due
to the government's failure to produce certain documents in response to the
District Court's discovery order. Also the Second Circuit noted that the 1955
increase in fines could not be made applicable to certain defendants indicted
before the legislation went into effect. See id. at 573-74. Upon remand, the
defendants were permitted to plead nolo contendere to the charges against them,
and the six association and company officers were fined a total of $42,000. No ]ail
sentences were mcted out in the second sentencing. See BNA Antitrust Rep. No.
21 (1961), p. A-1 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The average fines assessed against both
corporations and their officers, of course, have averaged considerably less than
the statutory maximum. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 532 n.9; Whiting, supra
note 4, at 942-43.
40 William Stolk, Chairman of the Board, Amencan Can Co., told stock-
holders at the company s annual meeting in 1961, that, although antitrust viola-
tions are very costly in terms of fines, money damages and counsel fees, "even
more costly is the extravagant loss of executives time and the continuing expense
of compliance with the judgment." He added: "The impact on our Company in
terms of lost time by key executives has undoubtedly exceeded by far the specific
dollar expenses of the tnal."
41 See generally Whiting, supra note 34, at 33-46. Reimbursement of the
executives fined on nolo pleas in United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Cr. No.
9584, N.D. Tex., 1955 (Dep't of Justice Case No. 126.3), however, was approved
in Koster v. Warren, 297 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1961) (Stockholder suit). Several
companies have "enacted" their own set of sanctions, ranging from reprimands




shareholders will bring suit to recover from him the corporation's
fine and expenses of suit.42
(5) No longer can the corporate officer count on paying his
way out of antitrust liability Jail sentences have become more
common for the punishment of individuals involved in flagrant
corporate violations. Increasing use of this sanction seems prob-
able.43
(6) In the last analysis, all of these in terrorem considerations
should pale before the realization that the Sherman Act is a
criminal statute. "White collar" cnme 44 or no, it is the fact of
indictment-in the public eye, itself a branding-that should serve
as the prime deterrent to the company representative who is con-
cerned about the effect such an indictment will have upon his
family, associates and friends. Those of you who have represented
indicted executives will appreciate that this can be for them a
profoundly distressing experience.45 Nor does the stigma end with
the filing of the indictment and its attendant publicity Still to
come are such common-criminal events as fingerprinting, making
bond, arraignment and, if he pleads or is found guilty or if the
usual nolo plea is entered and accepted, sentencing in open
criminal court.
42 See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 182 A.2d 828 (Del. Ch. 1962);
Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd mein., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). Recently the
Third Circuit upheld a shareholders derivative treble damage complaint naming
directors of his corporation as defendants where he had charged them with con-
spiring with another corporation to draw the shareholders corporation into an
antitrust violation. Rogers v. American Can Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 9170,854 (3d
Cir. 1962).
43 Thbirty-mne corporate executives received iail sentences in cases brought
during 1950-1960, although in all but 12 of these instances sentences were
suspended. The CCH Trade Reg. Rep. No. 175, Feb. 17, 1961, states that there
were nearly three times as many prison sentences handed down in this decade
as in any prior decade of antitrust enforcement.
44 Sutherland, White Collar Crime (1949).
45See Hamilton & Till, Antitrust in Action 80 (TNEC Monograph No. 16,
1940). See also, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., S. Res. 52, pt.
27 (Price Fixing and Bid Rigging in the Electrical Manufacturing Industry)
16952 (testimony of William Ginn) (1961). This paper is not meant to suggest
that executive observance of the antitrust laws should be dictated by purely
selfish concerns, but rather that there are additional and cogent personal reasons
for compliance which may not have been fully a preciated; and that most of
these anse from the executive s exposure to cnimmalsuit and involve well-defined
practices. The consequences of antitrust violation can be extremely serious to Ins
corporation. Here, however, the cluef threat undoubtedly is the civil suit and
decree wluhc, as Dean Rostow has said, "can change the structure of industries,
and shape their patterns of conduct, and even their habits." Hearings, supra note
20, at 114 (in letter to the Subcommittee Chairman).
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Counsel undertaking the task of antitrust instruction may
often become wearied by repetition and discouraged by apparent
executive failure to consult him or, even after consultation to take
his teachings to heart. But the instruction should somehow be
given and the lessons must somehow be learned. There is another
answer to John Cahill's question: American business need not
brand itself as criminal. It is an obvious answer, of course. Whether
it is a realistic answer depends largely upon our ability to com-
municate the fact that this answer exists-that the corporate repre-
sentative need not and for very practical and persuasive personal
reasons, should not, engage in practices, now fairly well defined,
which can easily lead to cnminal prosecution.
